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Estates and Trusts
Chapter 565: One More Law to Reform Conservatorships
and Guardianships; But Is It Needed?
Erik R. Beauchamp
Code Sections Affected
Financial Code §§ 765.5, 6850.5 (new); Probate Code §§ 2111.5, 2401.6
(new); §§ 2351, 2359, 2401, 2403, 2620 (amended).
AB 1950 (Pacheco); 2000 STAT. Ch. 565
I. INTRODUCTION
Conservatorships have existed for a few decades and guardianships have been
in use since at least the middle ages.' Historically, a guardian had possession of his
ward's 2 property and, except for the amount needed for the ward's support, all
income went to a guardian personally, so that a guardian could profit enormously
from the relationship Suspicion of corruption led to reforms.4
Unfortunately, the reasons for suspicion have not changed even with reform, and
the problems associated with guardianships have also developed with
conservatorships. In at least one highly publicized scandal, the operators of a
private conservatorship company in Riverside County, who had charge of hundreds
of wards, may have bilked their wards' estates out of over $1 million.6 The great
1. 12 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate § 819 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1999)
[hereinafter Witkin-Wills]; Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship in
California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. at 273,273-74 (1988); A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the Constitutional
Crisis With Procedural Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?, 7 ELDER L.J. 33, 38-58
(1999).
2. The technical term for the person being tended to by a conservator is a "conservatee," and the technical
term for a person being tended to by a guardian is a "ward." Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 275 n.3. Because
the law of conservatorships and the law of guardianships are so similar, the term "ward" will be used within this
article to refer to a "conservatee" of a conservatorship, as well as a "ward" of a guardianship. See Witkin-Wills,
supra note 1, §§ 890-903 (enumerating many of the provisions common to both guardianships and
conservatorships).
3. Robert B. Fleming & Carolyn J. Robinson, Care ofIncompetentAdults: A BriefHistory ofGuardianship,
ARIZ. Arr'y, Dec. 1993, at 16, 17.
4. Id.
5. See Christopher Manes, Guardian Angels, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2000), at 35 (recounting a scandal in which
a conservatorship company was alleged to have bilked wards out of millions of dollars); see also Friedman &
Savage, supra note 1, at 273-90 (describing some of the problems in California conservatorships such as elder abuse
and neglect).
6. Manes, supra note 5, at 35.
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power a guardian or conservator has over her ward can lead to abuse.7 Seeking to
remedy some of the abuse, mostly from conservatorships, the Legislature passed
Chapter 565.8 However, Chapter 565 only addresses a few of the problems arising
from conservatorships and may not address the core of the problem that led to the
Riverside County scandal.9 Moreover, some of the issues that Chapter 565 attempts
to clarify have already been addressed in prior law.'
II. EXISTING LAW
A. General Concepts
Guardianships and conservatorships come in two basic forms: of the person and
of the estate." A guardian or conservator of the person has custody of the ward and
ensures that the ward's daily needs are met. 2 The guardian or conservator of the
person also takes care of the ward's educational needs.'3 A guardian or conservator
of the estate has the duty to manage and control a ward's estate and finances. 4
Often, one person is in charge of both the person and the estate.' 5 Sometimes, one
person takes on the responsibilities of a person and another person takes on the
responsibilities of an estate. 16
Another type of conservatorship, created in 1980, is the limited conservatorship
for Developmentally Disabled Adults.' 7 This conservatorship was "designed to
encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence" of certain
7. Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 277; Manes, supra note 5, at 35.
8. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ONTHEJUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1950, at 3 (Apr. 25, 2000)
(reporting on the problems of the "guardianship and conservatorship system" exposed by the conservatorship
scandal in Riverside County and noting that Chapter 565 seeks to help remedy those problems).
9. See Manes, supra note 5, at 40 (describing some reform ideas such as IRS-style audits, and lamenting
that some reforms may never be satisfactory); see also Letter from Christopher S. Manes, Attorney at Law, Law
Offices of Howard L. Sanger, to Stephanie Abeyta, Staff Member, Office of California Assemblymen Rod Pacheco
(February 14, 2000) (on file with McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that Chapter 565 does not address some issues
such as the hiring of members of a conservator's family where the conservator has no direct financial interest).
10. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2101 (West 1991) (explaining that guardianship and conservatorship
relationships are "subject to the law relating to trusts"); see also 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Trusts, § 67 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1999) [hereinafter Witkin-Trusts] (noting that a trustee breaches his duty by self-
dealing or operating under a conflict of interest).
11. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2400 (West 1991); id. at § 2350 (West 1991); Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 819.
12. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2351 (West 1991).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 2401 (West 1991).
15. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 819.
16. Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 280.
17. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); Witkin-Wills, supra note I, § 980; see CAL. PROB.
CODE § 1420 (West 1991) (defining developmental disability as a "disability which originates before an individual
attains 18, continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial hardship" and can
include "mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism").
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developmentally disabled adults who did not need absolute supervision and could
take on more of the responsibility for the care of themselves and their estates.1
The main difference between a guardianship and a conservatorship is that a
guardianship is used for a minor, while a conservatorship is used for an adult who
has become incompetent. 19 However, for married minors who are incompetent, a
court usually appoints a conservator of the person for their daily needs, but appoints
a guardian of the estate to take care of their financial issues.20 Much of the difference
between a conservatorship and a guardianship is merely semantics, but guardianship
law provides for consideration of the rights of parents, whereas conservatorship law
is concerned with the mental and physical capacity of a person.2 The types of
conservatorships are arranged according to the particular capacity of the person,
such as a limited conservatorship for the developmentally disabled or a
conservatorship for an absentee. 2 Generally, the duties of a guardian and
23
conservator are the same and are enacted under the same code sections.
B. When an Appointment Should Be Made
A conservator of the person can be appointed for a person "who is unable to
provide properly for her personal needs for health, clothing, food, or shelter," and
a conservator of the estate can be appointed "for a person who is substantially
unable to manage [her] own financial resources or resist fraud or undue influence. 24
Additionally, a conservator of the estate can be appointed for an absentee.25 Of
course, a guardian is usually appointed when a ward is a minor.26
A petition for guardianship or conservatorship begins the process.27 Typically,
a relative petitions for a conservatorship, but often the process is initiated by a
public agency or by a friend of the conservatee.28 A prospective ward can also
petition for a conservatorship. 29 A prospective ward or a relative petitioning for a
18. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (West 1991); Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 980.
19. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 822.
20. Id. § 851; CAL. PROB. CODE § 1515 (West 1991).
21. See Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, §§ 819-820 (comparing the law of guardianships to the law of
conservatorships and discussing the various types of conservatorships each of which are based on a ward's inability
to care for herself or her own estate).
22. Id. § 862. An absentee is a person, such as a member of the armed forces stationed overseas, who cannot
properly take care of her estate due to her absence. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1840 (West 1991).
23. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2351 (West 1991) (detailing some of the duties of both guardians and
conservators, such as caring for, controlling, taking custody of, and ensuring the education of the ward).
24. Id. § 1801 (West 1991).
25. Id. § 1803 (West 1991).
26. Id. § 1500 (West 1991); Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 847.
27. See Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, §§ 853, 865 (illustrating the procedure involved in petitioning the court
for a guardianship or conservatorship-the first step in establishing a guardianship or conservatorship).
28. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1803; Id. § 2900 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at
280.
29. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1820 (West 1991).
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conservatorship may nominate a specific conservator, and courts often grant the
request. 30 Yet, depending on the circumstances, the court may appoint someone
else.31 In the case of a guardianship, parental rights and the wishes of the child are
often taken into consideration, but the court makes the final determination of
whether the proposed guardian is suitable.32
After a petition is filed, but before a hearing, a court investigator creates a report
regarding the circumstances of the proposed ward and submits it to the appropriate
court.33 At the hearing and based on this report, the court appoints a guardian or
conservator if the court determines a guardianship or conservatorship is necessary.34
A guardianship of the person or of the estate is terminated when the ward dies
or reaches the age of majority, but a guardianship of the person is also terminated
when the ward is married or adopted.35 A conservatorship only terminates upon the
death of the ward or by court order.36 A limited conservatorship is also terminated
for those reasons but is also terminated by the death of the conservator.37
Nevertheless, most conservatorships are continued after the death of the conservator,
which protects the ward, so she merely needs another conservator; however, the
relationship between the deceased conservator and the ward ends.38
C. Powers of Guardian or Conservator
A guardian or conservator of the estate manages the ward's assets and uses the
income for the support and maintenance of the ward.39 If the income is not enough
for the support and management of the ward, the guardian or conservator can sell
or mortgage estate assets.40 The guardian or conservator may also maintain the
ward's home, pay debts, and pay for services for the ward.4'
A guardian or conservator of the person has "the care, custody, and control of,
and has charge of the education of [the ward] .,,4 However, the court may limit the
powers of a conservator depending on the circumstances.43 These powers relate to
the living arrangements, the daily needs, and the medical necessities of the ward.44
30. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 864.
31. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1810-1812 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
32. Id. §§ 1500-1501 (West 1991); Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, §§ 848-850, 852, 859.
33. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1826 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
34. Id. § 1514 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); id. § 1827 (West 1991).
35. Id. § 1600 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
36. Id. § 1860 (West 1991).
37. Id. § 1860.5 (West 1991).
38. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 881.
39. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2401, 2420 (West 1991).
40. Id. § 2420.
41. Id. §§ 2431, 2457 (West 1991).
42. ld.§ 2351 (West 1991).
43. Id.
44. See Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, §§ 913-918 (detailing the powers of a guardian and conservator of the
person).
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D. Fiduciary Duties
The relationship between a guardian or conservator and her ward "is subject to
the law relating to trusts. '45 The office of a guardian or conservator, as that of a
trustee, is onerous, and a guardian or conservator can be personally liable for losses
if she neglects her duties.46 In some cases, if a trustee neglects her duties, she is
personally liable for losses even if those losses are not a direct result of her neglect .
For instance, if a trustee commingles trust assets with her own and a loss occurs, she
is personally liable.48 A trustee must also invest trust funds prudently, meaning that
the assets should be diversified and should not be placed in risky ventures.49
Although letting all the assets sit in a checking account may be safe, it is also
imprudent.5° In the modem era of investing, however, as long as a portfolio is well
balanced, the trustee is safe from liability.5 A trustee is given some flexibility, but
some common investments such as a second mortgage can be considered improper.
52
A trustee must also avoid conflicts of interest and avoid engaging in self-
dealing.53 Thus, a trustee cannot use trust property for her own profit or "take part
in any transaction in which the trustee has an interest adverse to the beneficiary.
54
In other words, a trustee cannot utilize trust assets to employ a business in which she
has an interest.55 These fiduciary duties of a trustee are also the fiduciary duties of
a guardian or conservatee for the benefit of a ward.56
45. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2101 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
46. See Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 891 (stressing that a guardian is absolutely liable for losses if she
surrenders control over assets).
47. G. Michael Richwine, How Individual Trustees Can Avoid Liability and Breaches of Trust, 24 EST.
PLAN. 481, 482 (1997); see, e.g., In re McCabe's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 503, 504, 220 P.2d 614, 616 (1950)
(finding that although the trustee proved that she had spent money in support of the beneficiary, the trustee was still
liable for the amount of assets originally given to the beneficiary plus interest, because the trustee commingled the
trust assets with her own).
48. See In re McCabe's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d at 504, 220 P.2d at 616 (ruling that placing trust funds in
accounts that cause these funds to be indistinguishable from the other assets in the account constitutes a mingling
of assets, and trustees are liable for the losses that result); see also Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, § 74 (detailing a
trustee's duty to keep property separate from her own property and from trusts belonging to others).
49. See Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, § 79 (defining the prudent investor rule).
50. See Lynch v. Redfield, 9 Cal. App. 3d 293,298,88 Cal. Rptr. 86,89 (1970) (stating that a trustee should
invest funds so that the funds will produce income rather than sit idle for an unreasonable length of time).
51. Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, § 82A.
52. See id., § 79 (stating that second mortgages are not proper investments). Second mortgages can be risky
because if the lender of the first mortgage forecloses, the lender of the second mortgage might not be able to recover
her investment. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, § 4.5 (1994). However, there may be some circumstances
where a second mortgage is permissible. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt.
n (1992).
53. Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, § 67, 70.
54. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16004 (West 1991).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 2101 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
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Specific provisions also exist for the sale of property by a guardian or
conservator.57 A guardian or conservator may sell real property, but only if the court
specifically gives approval to the guardian or conservator either for a specific
transaction or to sell real estate generally. 58 Sales of securities and personal property
under $5,000 per calender year can generally be made without court approval, but
all other personal property sales require court approval.5
Leases are subject to similar restrictions. 6° A guardian or conservator cannot
lease property without court approval unless the lease is for $1,500 a month or less
and for a term not greater than two years.6' Moreover, the power to lease may be
obtained in advance by the court.62 In addition, a guardian or conservator cannot
borrow money without court approval, but the court can grant this power in
advance.63 A guardian or conservator may only borrow money to "pay, reduce,
extend, or renew" an existing loan or to "erect, alter, or repair" buildings or improve
property owned by the ward. 64 The powers granted in advance to lease, sell, or
borrow without the need to petition are given only if they are "to the advantage,
benefit, and best interest" of the ward's estate.65
E. Accountings and Statewide Registry
State law requires that a guardian or conservator make "accountings ' 66 after one
year from the time of appointment and, thereafter at least every two years unless
otherwise ordered by a court.67 Upon the death of a ward, a guardian or conservator
must make two final accountings for the period before and the period after the date
of death.68 Only guardians or conservators of the estate need to file an accounting.69
A guardian or conservator can petition the court to have her acts approved or
57. See Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, §§ 934-943 (detailing the powers of a guardian or a conservator to sell
and lease the ward's property and the procedures for using that power).
58. Id. § 934, 947-49.
59. Id. §§ 934-945.
60. See id. §§ 934-43 (detailing the sales and lease transaction which require court approval).
61. Id. §939.
62. Id. §§ 947-949.
63. Id. § 938, 947-949.
64. Id. § 938(b).
65. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2590 (West 1991).
66. An accounting is a report of all income earned by a ward's estate, the expenses and losses incurred by
the ward's estate, the value and contents of any assets in the ward's estate, and any other disbursements made from
the estate. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1061 (West Supp. 2000).
67. 1998 Cal. Stat. ch. 581, sec. 22, at 38 (amending Probate code section § 2620).
68. Id.
69. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2600 (West 1991) (clarifying that only a conservator or guardian of the estate
is required to file an accounting); Conservatorship of Munson, 87 Cal. App. 3d 515, 518, 152 Cal. Rptr. 12, 13
(1978) (deciding that no guardianship or conservator of the person need file an accounting).
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confirmed.° A guardian or conservator usually seeks approval or confirmation if she
might be subject to liability when doubt is raised about an action.71
Private professional conservators and guardians are required to register with the
county clerk in the jurisdiction where they are appointed, and no court can appoint
a private professional conservator or guardian unless they are so registered.72 In
1999, Chapter 409 was signed into law, requiring private professional guardians and
conservators to also register with a new statewide registry maintained by the
Department of Justice. 73 When registering, conservators and guardians must file a
"signed declaration" with the registry.74 This declaration includes information about
a conservator's or guardian's educational background, professional experience, list
of current wards, and the amount of assets under her supervision.7 The declaration
must also disclose whether the conservator or guardian has been removed for cause
or resigned as well as the circumstances of removal or resignation.76 Similar
information was previously required to be filed with the clerk in each county court,
but other counties could not access this information easily.77 Since January 1, 2000,
any complaint against a conservator or guardian "found to be meritorious by the
court" must be forwarded by the clerk of the court to the statewide registry.78 A
court must examine the statewide registry before appointing a guardian or
conservator unless it is urgent that one be appointed.79
F Remedies for Breach
The guardian or conservator can be removed for mismanagement of an estate,
failure to file an inventory or account, incapacity, gross immorality, a felonious
conviction, adverse interest, or bankruptcy.8 ° She can also be removed if it is in the
best interest of the ward.8'
A ward can also sue the guardian or conservator if a duty is breached.82 If
damages occur as a result of a breached duty, the ward can recover those damages
plus interest. 83 Moreover, a ward can move to set aside acts made by the guardian
70. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2359, 2403 (West 1991).
71. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 925.
72. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2340 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
73. id. § 2850 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
74. Id. § 2850(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
75. id.
76. Id. § 2850(b)(8).
77. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2342 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 925,
at 5 (Aug. 27, 2000).
78. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2850(e).
79. Id. §§ 2851, 2853 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
80. Id. § 2650 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
81. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 967. The best interest of the ward is a catch-all provision giving the court
great discretion to remove a guardian or conservator for a reason not enumerated in the statute. Id.
82. Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, § 133.
83. Id.
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or conservator, such as the sale of property. 84 In this situation, bona fide purchasers 85
may retain their rights in the property; however, if losses occur, the guardian or
conservator must pay the difference.86 Moreover, the ward can obtain any profits the
guardian or conservator made and any profit the estate would have received but for
the breach, plus interest.87 Nevertheless, the court may excuse the damages if the
guardian or conservator acted "reasonably and in good faith under the
circumstances. ' '88 The ward can also be reimbursed by a surety if the guardian or
conservator was required to be bonded.89
G. Types of Conservators and Guardians
There are many types of conservators and guardians. 90 A conservator or
guardian may be a relative or friend, a private fiduciary company, a charitable
corporation, or the public guardian. 9' A relative or friend is someone close to the
ward whom the court believes will have the ward's interests at heart.92 Often, the
relative or friend was helping the ward even before the petition for conservatorship
was filed and may have actually initiated the petition.93 If a relative or friend is
willing and able to care for a ward, that person may be appointed by the court.9 4
A private fiduciary company is a company that profits by being a conservator
of a ward's person or estate. 95 Such a fiduciary company will have many wards.96
A private fiduciary company, like all conservators or guardians, is compensated for
all "reasonable expenses," but is also compensated for any service by the company
84. Id.
85. A bona fide purchaser is defined as one who buys for value without notice of any adverse claims.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (7th ed. 1999).
86. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401.3 (West 1991); Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, § 138.
87. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401.3 (West 1991).
88. Id.
89. See Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, §§ 909-911 (illustrating the requirements of bonding of guardians and
conservators).
90. See id. §§ 848-850, 897, 892,903-907 (recounting numerous cases in which the guardian was a relative
and discussing private fiduciary companies, charitable corporations, and the public guardian); see also Friedman
& Savage, supra note 1, at 279-81 (explaining that the public guardian is called upon when the proposed ward has
no family or friends to take care of her and citing an example of a ward whose neighbor and another acquaintance
became the conservators of the ward).
91. Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 279-81.
92. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1810 (West 1991) (stating that a court will only appoint a proposed conservator
if the appointment is in the best interests of the ward); see also Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 282 (discussing
a case in which a neighbor, who was "friendly to the ward," was appointed conservator); Witkin-Wills, supra note
1, § 859 (pointing out that a nominee for guardianship will not be appointed if she is deemed unsuitable).
93. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 280 (noting that, if the public guardian does not petition the
court, a relative usually petitions the court and proposes to be the conservator). The court investigator usually
acquiesces to this arrangement. Id..
94. Supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 897.
96. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2340 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000) (establishing that part of the definition of a
private professional conservator is a person or entity with two or more wards).
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that the court "determines is just and reasonable." 97 The public guardian is a
government agency, usually run by a county, that takes care of those for whom no
one else cares.98 Frequently, these individuals are indigent.99
The reasons why one type of conservator is chosen over another vary from case
to case.' 0 For instance, a private fiduciary company is appropriately chosen if no
relative comes forward to take on the responsibilities of a conservator or guardian,
and money is available to pay for the company's services.'0 ' However, the public
guardian is the last resort when no one else will take on such responsibility.0
2
H. Judicial Issues
1. Judicial Conflicts of Interest
Existing law also requires that judges °3 refrain from conflicts of interest."° In
fact, judges must follow a higher standard than guardians and conservators because
judges oversee the actions of guardians and conservators.'05 The rationale is that
since the judiciary has such great power over society, the judiciary must be beyond
reproach.' °6 Judges must not be involved in any business or transaction with any
person who might come before her or the court in which she serves. 10 7 A judge may
only be an executor or trustee for members of her own family,'0 8 and "only if such
service will not interfere with proper performance of judicial duties."' 9 A judge
should discourage similar involvement of her own family in order to dispel any hint
of impropriety." t0 However, a judge is not reasonably expected to know of all the
97. Id. § 2623 (West 1991).
98. Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 279-80.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Raymond Smith, New Conservatorship Claim Family Split, Money Looted, 3 People Say,
PRESS-ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.), June 5, 1999, at Al (exemplifying one California case in which a private
conservator was appointed when the situation with the ward's mother as conservator became unsatisfactory); see
also Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 897 (defining a private conservator company as a conservator that cares for a
ward's person or estate for profit).
101. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 897.
102. Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 279-80.
103. A judge is defined within the California Code ofJudicial Ethics as "an officer of the state Judicial system
... who performs judicial functions." CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 6(A) (2000). This definition includes
magistrates, court commissioners, referees, court-appointed arbitrators, judges of the State Bar Court, temporary
judges, and special masters. Id.
104. Id. Canon 4 (1999). A conflict of interest is defined as a "real or seeming incompatibility between one's
private interests and one's public or fiduciary duties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 295 (4th ed. 1999).
105. See CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHics Preamble (1999) (stating that judges must be beyond reproach because
they "interpret and apply the laws that govern us").
106. Id.
107. Id. Canon 4(D)(1) (1999).
108. See id. Terminology (1999) (defining a member of the judge's family as a "spouse, child, grandchild,
parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship").
109. Id. Canon 4(E)(1) (1999).
110. Id.
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business dealings in which her family is involved."' Judges who break these rules
can be sanctioned depending on the severity of the offense." 2 Such sanctions can
range from a reprimand to removal." 
3
To guide the ethical conduct of employees of the courts, a Model Code of Ethics
for the Court Employees of California was created.' "4 Each trial and appellate court
is required to adopt its own rules of ethical behavior based on this Model Code." 5
The Code requires that court employees refrain from any actual impropriety or from
the appearance of impropriety; additionally, employees may not use confidential
information for their "personal advantage."
' 16
2. Judicial Immunity
Judges have immunity from defending "civil suit[s] in the exercise of their
judicial functions.' '"7 In fact, judges retain immunity even when they act
maliciously or corruptly."8 The policy undergirding this rule is that a judge should
be free from the possibility of defending suits and personal detriment to himself
when exercising his authority, so that justice can be administered properly."9
However, the rule comes from the common law, and a statute can overturn it. 12
0
In Frost v. Geernaert, the plaintiff attempted to sue seven judges and argued that a
Government Code Section 822.2 made the judges liable if they were "guilty of
fraud, corruption, or actual malice."' 2' The section merely referred to "public
employees," but the term "employee" was defined in Government Code Section
810.2 to include a "judicial officer."'' 22 However, Section 810.2 was amended to
include judicial officers in 1977, after the enactment of the Section 822.2, and the
legislature's stated intent in the bill amending Section 810.2 did not state that this
inclusion was meant to expand judicial liability and, in fact, may have been to
confine the liability of government employees. 123 Therefore, the court ruled that the
111. See id. Canon 4(D)(5) Advisory Committee Commentary (1999) (stating that ajudge cannot reasonably
be expected to control or know about all the business dealings of her family).
112. Id. Preamble (1999).
113. Mike Kataoka, Judge 'sActions Questioned: Lawyer Faults Connection to Inland Woman's Trust, PRESS-
ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.), May 28, 1999, at Al.
114. 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts § 400 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter Witkin-Courts].
115. Id.
116. MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE COURT EMPLOYEES OF CALIFORNIA Tenet 4-6 (1994). Copies of the
MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR COURT EMPLOYEES OF CALIFORNIA are available from the administrative offices of
California Courts. Witkin-Courts, supra note 114, § 400.
117. Tagliavia v. County of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 759, 761, 169 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1980).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Frost v. Geernaert, 200 Cal. App.3d 1104, 1107, 246 Cal. Rptr. 440, 441 (1988).
121. Id. at 1108, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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judges had judicial immunity even though a strict reading of the statute may have
shown that the judges could be liable. 124
III. THE PROBLEM
Ultimately, the problem with conservatorships and guardianships is that the
wards, either minors or adults, unable to care for their persons or estates, are
inherently vulnerable. 125 The guardian or conservator has great power over the ward,
and the ward may have little ability to resist if they discover that their conservator
or guardian has breached their trust.126 A ward cannot simply call an attorney to have
a conservator or guardian removed. 127 Many wards are senile, so they will probably
not be taken seriously by those with whom they come into contact. 28 Some wards
are so severely disabled that they are unable to attend the hearings establishing their
status as wards. 129 Occasionally, conservators or guardians prevent their wards from
seeing other people to avoid the discovery of the conservator's or guardian's
nefarious purposes. 3 ° Essentially, a ward has to rely on the integrity of a conservator
or guardian.' 3 '
Integrity on the part of the conservator was completely missing when the
Riverside Conservatorship Scandal was publicized in 1999.132 West Coast
Conservatorships was a private fiduciary company that served as the conservator for
many wards, almost all of whom were elderly.133 For a long time, the owner of West
Coast was able to obtain assets from wards for her own benefit. 134 She often referred
business to an in-home health care business that she owned. 135 The alleged thefts and
124. Id. at 1109, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
125. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000) (allowing a conservatorship of the estate to be
created when the prospective ward cannot resist fraud); see also Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 274
(demonstrating that the wards in one average California county are almost always old and vulnerable).
126. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 273-74 (stating that a conservator has great power over a ward
and showing examples of wards who have great difficulty communicating because of illnesses like stroke and
senility).
127. Id. at 277.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 280-81.
130. See Manes, supra note 5, at 36 (giving one egregious example where the conservator made it difficult
for relatives to see the ward in order to hide the fact that the conservator was stealing from the ward).
131. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 1, at 273 (noting that many wards cannot take care of themselves
and cannot complain so they must rely on their conservator); see also Manes, supra note 5, at 40 (asserting that the
conservatorship system relies on the goodwill of others).
132. See Manes, supra note 5, at 35-40 (detailing how one conservatorship company may have stolen over
$1 million from its wards).
133. Id. at 35.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 37.
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misappropriation of funds totaled close to $1 million.'36 Consequently, the owner
and some of her associates now face severe criminal and civil penalties for breach
of trust and outright theft. 1
37
West Coast was able to steal so much money from its wards for such a long time
because the system failed. 138 The district attorney's office failed to investigate even
when complaints were made. 39 More disconcerting, the County's probate judge,
William H. Sullivan, may have trusted West Coast and its owner more than he
should have.140 Investigators and relatives notified the judge of possible fraud, but
West Coast explained away the allegations in a manner that was suspicious.'
4
'
Nevertheless, the judge accepted the explanations. 42 The judge assessed a surcharge
against West Coast when he discovered that the owner of West Coast was "farming
out work to her own health care company," but he did not do much more than
that. 14
3
Additionally, the judge may have had his own conflicts of interest. '14 Although
no evidence was found indicating that the judge profited from the irregularities at
West Coast, his extensive real estate dealings allegedly included buying property
from a ward of a conservatorship over which he presided. 145 He also was alleged to
have acted as a trustee of a trust for a non-relative in violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics. 146 After the West Coast scandal broke out, Judge Sullivan asked to
be reassigned, but ultimately announced his retirement under a cloud of
controversy. 
47
136. Mike Kataoka, Civil Suit Filed in Trust-Fund Scandal: The Defendants, Accused of Defrauding Clients
of a Private Conservatorship Firm in Riverside, Already Face Criminal Charges, PRESS-ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.),
May 19, 2000, at B I [hereinafter Kataoka-Civil Suit Filed].
137. Id.; Manes, supra note 5, at 40.
138. See id. (reporting the findings of an investigator who discovered that the system's checks and balances,
such as the judge's and district attorney's oversight, may have broken down, allowing West Coast to steal its wards'
assets).
139. Id. at 37.
140. See id. at 39 (detailing the judge's dealings with West Coast and emphasizing the judge's failure to
address the investigators' suspicion of fraud).
141. Id. at 39.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. (detailing the judge's conflicts of interest with conservatorships over which he presided).
145. Id.; Raymond Smith, Riverside Conservator Under Investigation: A Riverside County Probe Into
Financial Services Company Raises Questions About How People Are Appointed to Protect the Financially
Vulnerable, PRESS-ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.), Mar. 30, 1999, at Al.
146. Mike Kataoka, Probate Judge's Actions Raise Ethical Questions: Sullivan Denies Doing Anything
Improper, PRESS-ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.), Apr. 18, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Kataoka-Probate Judge's Actions].
147. Id.; Mike Kataoka, Judge in Probate Cases to Retire: Career Brought Questions, Praise, PRESS-ENTER.
(Riverside, Cal.), Nov. 19, 1999, at Al.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 32
The axe fell on more than one head in the scandal; other officials and agencies
were also blamed.'48 Basically, the system failed to protect the wards.149 West Coast
was able to steal from its wards and exercise self-dealing in managing its wards'
funds, because the judge, the local Probate Bar, and other institutions looked the
other way.' 50 The owner of West Coast was "well-connected" in Riverside society. 5'
The community must have had difficulty believing that someone so well-known
could have been stealing from her wards.152 To make matters worse, the Probate Bar
was so close-knit that when one relative of a ward wanted to remove West Coast,
she had to go outside the county to find an attorney. 53 In Riverside County, the
fraud, interwoven among insiders, was difficult to unravel. 154
Widespread theft by conservatorship companies is not the only cause for
concern."' The relatives of wards who are appointed as conservators or guardians
also steal money from their wards and some do not care enough to give the proper
care that a ward needs. 156 Such neglect is inconsistent with the role of a conservator
or a guardian, which requires the exercise of care and concern for the ward. 57 Care
and concern are primary to the role of a conservator or guardian.158 Without this
inherent element, wards of conservatorships or guardianships are prone to being
abused.
59
In 1996, an estimated 449,924 elderly persons were abused or neglected by
others.' 6 Financial abuse and exploitation161 accounted for 30.2% of all elderly
148. See Manes, supra note 5, at 35 (explaining that many people were indicted or lost their jobs in the
scandal, and government agencies, including the public defender's office and district attorney's office, were
blamed).
149. Id.
150. See id. (explaining an investigator's report that the system broke down and that all concerned, including
the judge and the Probate Bar, were to blame).
151. Id. at 38.
152. See id. at 40 (charging that, according to one investigator, all the officials and attorneys involved covered
for one another, allowing West Coast to regularly take money from its wards for a long time).
153. Id. at 36, 40.
154. Id.
155. See National Center on Elder Abuse, The Basics: What Is ElderAbuse, available at http://www.gwjapan.
com/NCEA/basic/index.html (last visited July 14, 2000) (copy on file with McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter
Elder Abuse Basics] (stating that family and other caregivers often exploit elders financially).
156. See id. (asserting that caregivers often neglect their wards); see also Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 847-
855, 864 (illustrating that a conservator or guardian may be a relative of the ward).
157. See Manes, supra note 5, at 40 (emphasizing that, according to a professional conservator, a conservator
must care about her charges).
158. See id. at 35 (revealing that cases of conservator mismanagement slipped through the cracks even when
signs of trouble were brought in front of a judge).
159. See id. (same).
160. NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE AT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES ASSOCIATION, THE
NATIONAL ELDER ABUSEINCIDENCE STUDY Executive Summary 4 (1998) [hereinafter ELDER ABUSE STUDY] (copy
on file with McGeorge Law Review).
161. Financial and Material Exploitation is defined as "[illlegal or improper use of an elder's funds, property,
or assets." NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, Types of Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings, available at
http://www.gwjapan.com/NCEA/basic/factl.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2000) (copy on file with McGeorge Law
Review).
2001 /Estates and Trusts
abuse. '62 Family members were the most frequent abusers, as they were responsible
for 89.6% of all abuse. 163 Friends, neighbors, and professional care-givers made up
the rest. 164 More than half of the abused were not able to completely take care of
themselves, and at least 45% were confused at least part of the time. 165 Of course,
confused and incapacitated individuals are just the sort of people who need a
conservatorship. 166 Worse yet, the vast majority of abuse goes unreported. 167 This
is not surprising, because the victims are confused, unable to care for themselves,
and vulnerable. 168 Financial abuse and exploitation of the elderly, as well as other
types of elderly abuse, are a huge problem.
169
Moreover, the number of elderly Americans is increasing. 170 The baby boom
generation is becoming older, and as a result, at least one in five Americans will be
65 years old or older in 2030.17' The increase in the elderly population will
perpetuate the need for conservatorships and conservators.1
72
Another problem is that there may not be enough people who want to be a
conservator. 173 Caring for the elderly is a stressful undertaking. 7 4 The fiduciary
duties involved in being a conservator of the estate are onerous.' 75 In his own
defense, Judge Sullivan said that he often appointed West Coast as conservator for
wards because he had "few other choices for qualified private professional
conservators in Riverside." 176 Few people really want to be caregivers; therefore, the
162. ELDER ABUSE STUDY, supra note 160, pt. IV, at 7.
163. Id. at Executive Summary 10.
164. Id.
165. Id. at Executive Summary 9.
166. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (West 2000) (stating the condition a ward should be in for a conservator
of the estate and of the person to be appointed).
167. See ELDER ABUSE STUDY, supra note 160, at Executive Summary 9, 18 (asserting that elder abuse is
under-reported, that many elderly people are unable to take care of themselves and are confused, and that elder
abuse is difficult to detect because elders are often isolated).
168. Id.
169. See ELDER ABUSE STUDY, supra note 160, at Executive Summary 5 (illustrating that in 1996, 21,427
out of 115,110 reports of abuse and neglect of the elderly nationwide were reports of financial or material
exploitation).
170. Lynn Friss Feinberg, Options for Supporting Information and Family Caregiving, Executive Summary,
available at http://www.asaging.org/pew/feinberg/feinberg-exsum.html (last visited Aug. 8,2000) (copy on file with
McGeorge Law Review).
171. Id. The number of elderly in 2030 will be "more than twice" the number of elderly in 1995. Id.
172. See id. (arguing that increased demands will be "placed on family and other information caregivers").
173. See Kataoka-Probate Judge's Actions, supra note 146, at A3 (reporting that Judge Sullivan claimed to
have few choices available in appointing conservators in Riverside County); see also Denise M. Brown, The Care
Giving Years: Six Stages to a Meaningful Journey, available at http://www.aarplifeanswers.conV article-library/
documents /12639.pdf (last visited Aug. 8,2000) (copy on file with McGeorge Law Review) (lamenting that people
tend not to provide emotional support to those caring for an elderly relative).
174. Elder Abuse Basics, supra note 155.
175. See Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 891 (warning that a guardian is absolutely liable for losses if she
surrenders control over the ward's assets); supra text accompanying note 46.
176. Kataoka-Probate Judge's Actions, supra note 146, at A3.
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choices are truly limited.177 With the increased need for conservatorships, the lack
of those willing to be conservators, and the potential for abuse, it is questionable
whether the system can be kept afloat. 178
IV. CHAPTER 565
A. Prohibition Against Referring Business
Chapter 565 prohibits a guardian or conservator of the estate or of the person
who is required to register with the Statewide Registry 179 from hiring or referring
"any business to an entity in which he or she has a financial interest" without court
approval.180 Furthermore, to get court approval, the conservator must disclose any
financial interest to the court.'18 The financial interests that require disclosure
include "ownership interest in a sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a closely held
corporation," ownership of more than one percent of the shares in a corporation
traded publicly, or the status of "an officer or a director of a corporation."'
181
B. Prohibition Against Court Officials Transacting in Estate Property
Chapter 565 also prohibits court officials or employees who have duties or
responsibilities related to "(1) the appointment of a conservator or guardian, or (2)
the processing of any document related to a conservator or guardian" from
"purchasing, leasing, or renting any real or personal property" from the ward's
estate.183 This prohibition also extends to persons related by blood or marriage to a
court official or employee. 84 However, such persons may purchase, but not rent or
lease, the ward's real or personal property if the purchase is made at a public sale. 185
On the other hand, if a prohibited transaction is made, "rescission of purchase, lease,
or rental of the property" will occur. 86 Additionally, the court can impose civil
177. See id. (reporting that Judge Sullivan complained that he had few choices when appointing conservators);
see also Denise M. Brown, supra note 173 (stating that society does not support the idea of caring for the elderly);
see also Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 347, 351 (1998) (lamenting that a court may not have many choices as to who to appoint as a guardian).
178. Kataoka-Probate Judge's Actions, supra note 146, at A3; Feinberg, supra note 170; Manes, supra note
5, at 40.
179. Supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
180. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2351, 2401 (amended by Chapter 565).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. § 2111.5 (enacted by Chapter 565).
184. Id. Chapter 565 legally defines a person related by blood or marriage as a spouse or a relative within "the
second degree of lineal or collateral consanguinity" of the person in question or spouse of the relative as defined.
Id. Second degree of lineal or collateral consanguinity includes grandchildren, grandparents, siblings, and anyone
closer. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Descent and Distribution §§ 53, 55 (1983).
185. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2111.5 (enacted by Chapter 565).
186. Id.
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penalties "equal to three times" the resulting losses, if any, against the guardian,
conservator, or the court official or relative. 187 If no losses are incurred, the court
will impose a $5,000 fine.'88 The court can also "assess punitive damages."'89 These
penalties and punitive damages are assessed in addition to any other rights or
remedies provided by law." 190
C. Statement of Family or Affiliate Relationship When Seeking Court Approval
When a guardian or conservator of the estate petitions the court for an approval
of a "purchase, lease, or rental" of estate property, he or she must give the court a
statement of any "family or affiliate relationship between the guardian or
conservator and the purchaser, lessee, or renter" and a relationship with any agent
the guardian or conservator hires.' 9' A family relationship is defined as a "person's
spouse or relatives within the second degree of lineal or collateral consanguinity of
a person or person's spouse."' 92 An affiliate relationship means an entity, such as a
company or other person, with some control, usually financial, over the guardian or
conservator. 193
The new law regarding the provision of a statement of a family or affiliate
relationship to the court for approval of estate property transactions also applies to
guardianships and conservatorships of the person. 194 Upon a violation, the court will
impose civil penalties "equal to three times" the resulting losses, if any, against the
guardian, conservator, or relative. 195 If there are no losses, the court will impose a
$5,000 fine. 196 The court can also "assess punitive damages."' 197 Moreover, these
penalties and punitive damages are assessed in addition to any other rights or
remedies provided by law."'198
D. Fee Reimbursement Prohibition and Accounting Provisions
Chapter 565 further protects wards of guardianships and conservatorships
through its fee reimbursement prohibition and accounting provisions. 99 The new





191. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2403 (amended by Chapter 565).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. § 2359 (amended by Chapter 565).




199. Id. § 2401.6 (enacted by Chapter 565). Id. § 2620 (amended by Chapter 565).
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ward's estate when the guardian or conservator is assessed a fee or surcharge
because she breached a fiduciary duty to the ward. 200 The new law requires banks,
trust companies, and savings and loan associations to send to courts a copy of each
document regarding the status of an account when a guardian or a conservator opens
an account or changes the name of an account to reflect the conservatorship or
guardianship.20'
When the first accounting is made, the guardian or conservator must give the
court a copy of all bank or investment account statements with estate assets for "the
period immediately preceding the date" of appointment and the statements
"immediately preceding the date the accounting is filed. 202 For subsequent
accountings and for the final accounting, the guardian or conservator must submit
account statements for the most recent period to the court.203 These statements are
confidential and are only "subject to discovery" by court order.2°
V. ANALYSIS
A. What is Really New?
One problem with the Riverside Conservatorship scandal is that the probate
judge for the county seemed to overlook many of the suspicious actions of West
Coast Conservatorships that ultimately led to the theft of over $1 million. 205 Had the
judge been cognizant of West Coast's actions, he might have been able to prevent
or limit the alleged thefts.2° Chapter 565 prohibits guardians and conservators from
referring business to companies in which they have an interest.2 7 However, state law
prior to the enactment of Chapter 565 already prohibited guardians and conservators
from profiting from such obvious conflicts of interest. 2°8 Therefore, the enactment
of Chapter 565 was not necessary for the judge involved in the Riverside scandal to
200. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401.6 (enacted by Chapter 565).
201. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 765.5, 6850.5 (enacted by Chapter 565).
202. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2620(a) (amended by Chapter 565).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Manes, supra note 5, at 39; Mike Kataoka & Raymond Smith, Trustees 'Devoured' Estates, Panel Told:
Ex-Employees of West Coast Conservatorships Say in Court Documents That Nearly $1 Million Was Taken, PRESS-
ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.), May 2, 2000, at Al.
206. See Manes, supra note 5, at 39 (noting that the thefts involved in the West Coast scandal were perhaps
made possible because Judge Sullivan and other officials did not become suspicious even when irregularities were
brought to their attention).
207. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2351, 2401 (amended by Chapter 565).
208. Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, §§ 67, 70.
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have prevented, or at least limited, the losses of the wards. 2°9 The judge already had
the power of the law to interrupt such conflicts of interest.
210
Similarly, judges and court employees are prohibited from buying property from
wards. 211 The California Code of Judicial Ethics prevents judges from buying
property from wards, and the Model Code of Ethics for Court Employees of
California requires court employees to refrain from impropriety or hints of
impropriety.212 Certainly, buying from an estate of a ward who comes before the
court that the employee serves would constitute at least a hint of impropriety and
would be prohibited.213
The prohibition against allowing relatives from engaging in similar activity is
new.214 In the Code of Judicial Ethics, a judge is encouraged to make sure relatives
do not have dealings with someone coming before ajudge's court, but a judge is not
expected to know about all of his family's financial dealings.215 Accordingly, a court
employee's family is not mentioned in the Code of Ethics for Court Employees of
California. l6 Chapter 565 prohibits relatives of judges and court employees from
buying or leasing property in a ward's estate. 217 Before Chapter 565, whether the
purchase or lease of a ward's estate by a judge or court employee involved in the
conservatorship or guardianship was improper was unclear,218 but Chapter 565
209. See Manes, supra note 5, at 40 (quoting investigators who stated that had the judge in the case and others
not covered for one another, the scandal might not have occurred); see also supra Part I.D-F (enumerating the
fiduciary duties of guardians and conservators and the remedies available to wards and their families through the
courts).
210. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2653(b) (West 1991) (stating that a court may remove a guardian or conservator,
revoke powers, or require accountings depending on the court's judgment).
211. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2111.5 (enacted by Chapter 565).
212. CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS, Canon 4(D)(1)(b) (1999); MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE COURT
EMPLOYEES OF CALIFORNIA Tenet 5-6 (1994).
213. See MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE COURT EMPLOYEES OF CALIFORNIA, Guidelines for Tenet Six
(1994) (mandating that court employees refrain from any "activity that gives the impression that court employees
can be improperly influenced in the performance of their official duties").
214. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 2111.5 (enacted by Chapter 565) (providing that a relative of a court
official or employee with duties "related to the appointment of" or "processing of any document related to" a
conservator or guardian is prohibited from purchasing, leasing, or renting property from a ward's estate), with CAL.
CODE OFJUD. ETHICS, Canon 4(D)(5) Advisory Committee Notes (1999) (noting that ajudge cannot reasonably be
expected to control or know about all the business dealings of her family), and MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE
COURTEMPLOYEES OFCALIFORNIA Tenet 5-6 (1994) (requiring court employees to refrain from impropriety or hints
of impropriety, but not mentioning anything regarding an employee's relatives).
215. CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS, Canon 4(D)(5) Advisory Committee Comments.
216. See MODEL CODE FETHICS FOR THE COURT EMPLOYEES Tenet 5-6 (requiring court employees to refrain
from impropriety or hints of impropriety, but not mentioning the families of court employees).
217. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2111.5 (enacted by Chapter 565).
218. See MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE COURT EMPLOYEES OF CALIFORNIA Tenet 5-6 (prohibiting
impropriety or hints of impropriety on part of court employees); see also CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS, Canon 4(D)(5)
Advisory Committee Comments (requiring a judge to refrain from impropriety or hints of impropriety and to
encourage her family to do the same but pointing out that ajudge cannot reasonably be expected to control or know
about all the business dealings of her family).
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clearly prohibits such purchases and leases and even specifies which relatives are
included in the prohibition.219
The requirement that an individual provide a statement of "family or affiliate
relationship" to the court when seeking court approval for a purchase, lease, or other
transaction does not add a duty to the job of a conservator or guardian. 220 To sell,
lease, or transact business with a close relative or with an entity in which a
conservator or guardian has a financial interest is surely a conflict of interest.221 The
way to avoid the restriction associated with this conflict of interest is to get court
approval of the transaction.222 In trying to remedy a conflict of interest by getting the
court's approval, a conservator or guardian would likely inform the court of the
relationships that create the concern anyway.223 The most significant new provisions
of Chapter 565 are the penalties imposing three times the losses or $5,000 if there
are no losses due to breaches of duty.224 However, the ward has always been able to
rescind the transaction, obtain any profits the guardian or conservator made, and
recoup the losses or any profits that the estate should have made but for the breach
of duty.225 Therefore, the new penalties may not be necessary because alternate
remedies already exist.226
Chapter 565 also impedes judicial immunity, which is troubling. Since judicial
immunity comes from common law, this statute overrules it unless a court can find
some way to exclude the term "court official" from the statute.227 However, the
statute seems fairly clear that it includes judges. Chapter 565 makes the distinction
between court employees and court officials. 8 Moreover, the bill analyses make
mention of the problem with the conflict of interest of the probate judge in the
219. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2111.5 (enacted by Chapter 565).
220. Compare id. § 2403(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 565) (stating that when a guardian or conservator seeks
approval for a sale or lease of a ward's property, she provides a statement "disclosing the family or affiliate
relationship between the guardian and conservator" and the purchaser or lessee), with id. § 2101 (West 1991 &
Supp. 2000) (stating that the fiduciary duties of conservators and guardians is "governed by the law of trusts"), and
Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, §§ 67, 70 (stating that a trustee must not engage in conflicts of interests or self-
dealing).
221. See Witkin-Trusts, supra note 10, §§ 67, 70 (providing that conflicts of interest and self-dealing are
prohibited and giving examples of conflicts of interest and self-dealing).
222. Witkin-Wills, supra note 1, § 934.
223. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2403(a) (West 1991) (asserting that a conservator or guardian can get approval
or confirmation of her acts); see also id. § 2401.3(b) (stating that a court may excuse a conservator's or guardian's
acts if the guardian "acted reasonably and in good faith").
224. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2403(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 565); see supra Part IV.B (detailing the surcharge
created by Chapter 565).
225. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401.3(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000) (declaring that if a breach of a fiduciary
duty is found, the guardian or conservator may be liable for any loss of profit that would not have occurred but for
the breach of duty); id. § 2401.5 (West 2000) (asserting that if a breach of fiduciary duty is found, the guardian or
conservator may be liable for the interest that "accrues at the legal rate of [interest for] judgments" or" interest
actually received").
226. Id. § 2401.5 (West 2000).
227. See supra notes120-24 (illustrating a case where the court determined that the legislature did not intend
to overrule the common law policy of judicial immunity).
228. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2111.5 (enacted by Chapter 565).
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Riverside Conservatorship Scandal.229 In one bill analysis, the committee gets more
specific by saying that "the intent of the bill is to prevent 'insider deals' similar to
the purchase by the probate judge of a home that belonged to a conservatee. '230 Most
strikingly, the author's comments in the analysis of the Assembly Committee on the
Judiciary states that the class mentioned in the statute includes judges.231 Therefore,
a court could not so easily find judicial immunity as it did in Frost v. Geernaert.232
Now, a judge can be sued, so proper administration of justice-the goal of judicial
immunity-might be compromised. 3
B. Is More Reform Necessary?
With different groups pressuring legislatures to do something about elder abuse
and financial exploitation, legislatures have tried to reform conservatorship laws. 34
Some groups hope that one perfect set of rules will solve all of the problems in the
system.235 The reality is that no set of laws can be perfect. 6 For instance, if a new
law made the standards for becoming a guardian or conservator more stringent,
some people who probably do not need a conservatorship might retain their
independence; however, some incapacitated people may not get the help that they
need. 37 These reforms have solved some problems but exacerbated others. 8
Many competing priorities exist that have shaped the law.239 For example, one
priority is to protect the ward from unscrupulous people, while another is to keep the
ward as independent as possible. 240 However, these two priorities are mutually
exclusive.24I Additionally, conservatorships are expensive because of the need for
242
court supervision.
229. FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 1950, SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, at 6 (Aug. 10, 2000); FLOOR ANALYSIS OF
AB 1950, SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, at 6 (July 6, 2000); COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1950, SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, at 2 (Apr. 24, 2000); COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1950, ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
at 4 (Apr. 25, 2000).
230. COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1950, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, at 11 (Apr. 24, 2000).
231. COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1950, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, at 3 (Apr. 25, 2000).
232. Supra notes 120-24.
233. See Tagliavia, 112 Cal. App.3d at 761, 169 Cal.Rptr. at 467 (stating that the policy ofjudicial immunity
is to ensure proper administration of justice).
234. Frolik, supra note 177, at 347.
235. See id. (proclaiming that we may "hope for too perfect" a system).
236. Id. at 351.
237. Id. at 350.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 348 (noting that some believe a good system should stress protecting the incapacitated while
others believe a good system should stress independence).
240. Id. at 348.
241. Id.
242. See William M. McGovern, Jr., Trusts, Custodianships, and Durable Powers ofAttorney, 27 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 1, 4 (1992) (asserting that burdensome court proceedings in conservatorships are expensive).
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Furthermore, the system does not necessarily need more laws. 243 The abuses that
took place in Riverside County were already illegal. 2" Under the law prior to
Chapter 565, the owner of West Coast Conservators and some of her associates face
prison time and civil penalties.245 Had Judge Sullivan not stepped down, he could
have been reprimanded or even removed for his own alleged improprieties.246 The
law that existed before Chapter 565 already provided the means to punish the
individuals. 247
The problem centered not on reforming the law, but on enforcing the existing
law.248 Had Judge Sullivan used the laws that already existed, West Coast would not
have been able to defraud so many wards over such a long period of time.249 Because
the majority of judges follow the law, it is unusual for a judge to be disciplined.
But when a judge pays little attention to questions brought up by investigators and
wards' relatives, new laws are irrelevant.25' If a judge performs negligently,
exploitation of wards is always possible.252
C. Other Solutions
Some mechanisms for reform that might improve oversight have been
suggested.25 3 Some call for IRS-style random audits of guardianships and
conservatorships.254 These audits would be performed by a State agency which
would randomly select a small percentage of guardianships or conservatorships to
review their records and investigate the wards' situation.255 Hopefully, random
selection will catch some unscrupulous conservators and guardians and deter others.
243. See Frolik, supra note 177, at 351 (arguing that no matter how many reforms are put in statutes, if the
overseers of a conservatorship are corrupt, the statute will be of little use).
244. See Kataoka-Civil Suit Filed, supra note 136, at B1 (proclaiming that the owner of West Coast
Conservatorships and her associates face civil and criminal penalties).
245. Id.
246. Kataoka-Probate Judge's Actions, supra note 146, at Al.
247. Kataoka-Civil Suit Filed, supra note 136, at B1.
248. See Frolik, supra note 177, at 351 (arguing that the reformers should reform those responsible for
administrating conservatorships and not concentrate on reforming the procedures).
249. See Manes, supra note 5, at 37 (asserting that in order for West Coast to get away with what it did for
so long, "those responsible for the system's integrity had to ignore a number of warning signs").
250. See Kataoka-Probate Judge's Actions, supra note 146, at A1 (noting the findings of a judge who tracks
disciplinary actions against judges, to show that disciplinary actions against probate judges are uncommon).
251. See Frolik, supra note 177, at 351 (arguing that no matter how many reforms are enacted, if the overseers
of a conservatorship are corrupt, the statute will be of little use).
252. See Manes, supra note 5, at 35 (proclaiming that when a judge ignores suspicious activities of
conservators, wards can be exploited).
253. See id. at 40 (enumerating some reforms such as a statewide registry of conservators and IRS-style
audits).
254. Id.
255. See id. (describing IRS-style audits for conservators).
2001 /Estates and Trusts
Another suggestion is to delegate some of the duties of judges to other officials
who specialize in conservatorship and guardianship issues.256 With specialized
expertise, these officials can make decisions quicker and at less cost. 257 Moreover,
they could potentially take their "courts" to the nursing home or wherever the ward
resides if necessary.258 The examination of conservatorships and guardianships at the
ward's residence is not only more comfortable for the ward, but the official can
more easily ascertain the ward's situation. 9 With a graying population, many
jurisdictions may make use of this method to cut costs and increase efficiency.26°
Nonetheless, many commentators suggest that the best solution is to avoid a
conservatorship or guardianship altogether.26' Other alternatives are available that
are more flexible, less costly, and avoid judicial scrutiny.262 Trusts and durable
powers of attorney can be used, and most attorneys strongly favor these instruments
over a guardianship or conservatorship. 263 However, these instruments also present
problems. 264 While they are less costly and more flexible, trusts and durable powers
265
of attorney can lack oversight provisions. As with many aspects of dealing with
incapacity, society may just have to rely on the person who takes care of the
vulnerable and hope that that person does not take advantage of her position.266
VI. CONCLUSION
As the number of people over age 65 increases, many more conservatorships
will be created within the next few decades.267 Luckily, although the conservatorship
system is not perfect, it can produce acceptable results when it is used properly and
when existing laws are enforced by judges. 268 Chapter 565 was passed to refine the
law in the aftermath of an exemplary case of the system gone awry.269 Although
much of the law prohibiting judges, court employees, conservators, and guardians





261. McGovern, supra note 242, at 3.
262. See id. at 3-4 (arguing that powers of attorney and trusts are better instruments when a person becomes
incapacitated).
263. Id. at 3.
264. See id. at 4 (maintaining that a trust does not require as much supervision as a conservatorship).
265. See id. at 16 (noting that most trusts are written to avoid court supervision).
266. See Manes, supra note 5, at 40 (suggesting that a main qualification for a conservator is that she care
about her ward).
267. See supra Part III (warning that the population is getting older and that more conservatorships will
eventually be needed).
268. See supra Part V.B (arguing that the existing laws can solve many of the problems with conservatorships
if they are properly enforced).
269. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1950, at 5 (June 13, 2000)
(pointing to the Riverside conservatorship scandal when arguing for the need of Chapter 565).
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from acting under conflicts of interest and self-dealing already exists, the new
provisions under Chapter 565 decrease the likelihood that court officials, judges,
conservators, and guardians will be able take advantage of their positions by sending
business to their relatives, or by selling or leasing property to their relatives at low
prices.270 As the elderly population increases and more people need conservators,
more caring individuals are needed because caring is the most important
qualification of a conservator. However, new laws cannot make people more caring
or more diligent in their duties. If the problem is to be solved, individual judges,
conservators, or relatives of wards will have to care about the well-being of their
wards and keep a sharp lookout for potential abuse.
270. Supra Part V.A.
